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Abstract—We study the question of determining locations of
base stations that may belong to the same or to competing
service providers. We take into account the impact of these
decisions on the behavior of intelligent mobile terminals who
can connect to the base station that offers the best utility. The
signal to interference and noise ratio is used as the quantity that
determines the association. We first study the SINR association-
game: we determine the cells corresponding to each base stations,
i.e., the locations at which mobile terminals prefer to connect to
a given base station than to others. We make some surprising
observations: (i) displacing a base station a little in one direction
may result in a displacement of the boundary of the correspond-
ing cell to the opposite direction; (ii) A cell corresponding to a BS
may be the union of disconnected sub-cells. We then study the
hierarchical equilibrium in the combined BS location and mobile
association problem: we determine where to locate the BSs so as
to maximize the revenues obtained at the induced SINR mobile
association game. We consider the cases of single frequency band
and two frequency bands of operation. Finally, we also consider
hierarchical equilibria in two frequency systems with successive
interference cancellation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we study some hierarchical decision making
problems arising in the uplinks of cellular networks. We
first address the problem of association: given multiple base
stations (BS) capable of providing services to a mobile located
at a given point in the region of operation, to which BS should
the mobile connect? This is studied in a non-cooperative
context where each mobile connects to the BS that provides it
with the best signal to interference and noise ratio (SINR). The
associations determine the cells corresponding to each BS. We
characterize the nature of cells as a function of BS locations.
We then consider the problem of determining the locations
of base stations, taking into account the behavior of the
mobiles that will be induced by the location decisions. We
study cases where the BSs cooperate (e.g., they belong to
the same service provider) and those where they compete
with each other. The latter scenario results in a location game
between the BSs.
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Related work: Plastria [1] presented an overview of
research on locating one or more new facilities in an envi-
ronment where competing facilities already exist. Gabszewicz
and Thisse [2] provided another general overview on location
games. Mazalov and Sakaguchi [3] and references therein
studied competition over prices of goods between facilities
that have fixed positions. They then derived the equilibrium
allocation of customers. Such games, as well as hierarchical
games in which firms compete for location or over prices
which then determine the customer-allocation equilibrium,
were introduced by Hotelling [4] in 1929. When considering
such games over a finite line segment with two firms, the
models under appropriate conditions give rise to a partition
of the segment into two convex subsegments or “cells” as
introduced in our context.
An interesting difference between the settings above and our
setting, which is also defined on a finite line segment, is that
in our case more complex cells are obtained at equilibrium.
This is due to the difference in the cost structure in the cellular
context. Hotelling [4] considered a general cost related to the
distance between the customer and the firm it chooses; this
cost however depended only on the distance and not on the
actual location of the firm. This does not hold in our case:
the throughput of the mobile depends on the interference at
the base station which in turn depends on the location of the
base station. We finally note that in our model, the power of a
mobile, which can be considered as the “cost”, is fixed, while
it attempts to maximize the utility, i.e., throughput.
Aram et al. [5] study coalition based joint resource pro-
curement and resource allocation in wireless networks using
the framework of cooperative game theory. They consider a
set of operators and customers with predetermined customer-
operator associations. All the operators together place base
stations, procure spectrum, and allocate channels to the com-
mon pool of customers. Doing so is shown to be optimal
even when the operators are selfish. However, it is assumed
that operators can divide the aggregate earned utility in any
arbitrary way. In another work, Aram et al. [6] extend the
analysis to nontransferable utilities.
After the appearance of our initial work [7], Ramanath
et al. [8] have studied the joint placement of two base stations
that use same frequency. The utilities of BSs come from the
notion of α-fairness. They also consider a multicell scenario
where each cell has one BS, and all BSs operate on the
same frequency. The goal is to optimally place the BSs in
their respective cells so as to maximize their α-fair utilities.
Silva et al. [9] consider an association problem where mobiles
2have hard average throughput constraints, and the objective
of optimal association is to minimize the aggregate power
consumption of all the mobiles in the network. They also study
the downlink scenario under the assumption that neighboring
BSs operate in orthogonal channels. Again the objective is to
find an optimal association that minimizes the aggregate power
consumption of the BSs. Kasbekar et al. [10] consider a joint
problem of mobiles’ association and charging and spectrum
leasing by service providers.
A description of the model studied in this paper and the
notation used can be found in Section II and Appendix A.
Our contributions: First, we consider a code division
multiple access (CDMA) system where BSs perform single
mobile decoding. We derive analytical expressions for the
cell boundaries in the case where BSs are on the same
frequency band (Section III-A). This allows us to study the
geometric properties of cells as a function of the locations
of the BSs. We then study the hierarchical equilibrium in the
combined BS location and mobile association problem, i.e.,
we determine where to locate the BSs so as to maximize
the revenues obtained on the induced SINR-based mobile
association game (Section III-B). We also do the analogous
analyses for the case where BSs are on different frequency
bands (Section IV). Subsequently, we consider BSs capable
of successive interference cancellation (SIC) decoding. After a
discussion on the association problem and the single frequency
band case (Section V), we analyze the case of different
frequency bands and give a complete characterization of the
resulting equilibria (Section VI).
While the main body of our work assumes mobiles placed
over the line-segment [−L,L] ⊂ R, we discuss the extension
to two dimensional deployments in Appendix H.
II. THE MODEL AND NOTATION
Our focus is on communication in the uplink direction,
i.e., from mobiles to BSs. Mobiles and BSs lie in the two-
dimensional space R2. A large number of mobiles are placed
uniformly over the segment [−L,L] on the first of the coordi-
nate axes. The fluid approximation is obtained for the infinitely
large population of mobiles. For details see Appendix A. There
are two BSs, BS 1 and BS 2, located at (x1, 1) and (x2, 1),
respectively (say on the top of a flat building whose height is
one unit). BSs cooperate if they belong to the same operator,
and compete if they belong to different operators. We allow
placements of BSs outside the area where mobiles exist, i.e.,
xj < −L and xj > L are allowed for j = 1, 2. In the
following, we use only the first coordinates to specify locations
(with the understanding that second coordinates are 0 in case
of mobiles, and 1 in case of BSs).
Transmitters are point sources radiating in two-dimensional
space with circular wavefronts (respectively, three-dimensional
with spherical wavefronts). We consider a power law path loss
model with exponent α; i.e., the power from a radio transmitter
attenuates as distance raised to the power α (see Appendix A).
A mobile located at y has a channel “gain” of [(y − xj)2 +
1]−α/2 to BS j. All mobiles are assumed to transmit at a power
such that the power density along the line is unit power per
unit length. Thus the total transmitted power is 2L. Thermal
noise at the BSs is assumed to be Gaussian with noise variance
σ2 per sample.
At any time, each mobile is associated with exactly one
BS. Let Aj ⊂ [−L,L] be such that the mobiles in Aj are
associated with BS j. Aj will be called cell j. The utility of
a mobile at y is assumed to be a nondecreasing function of
the SINR density at y, as seen at the BS to which the mobile
is associated. The SINR density depends on the interference
model under consideration, which we discuss next.
A. Interference models
Mobiles that connect to a particular BS may or may not
cause interference to the other BS depending on whether the
BSs operate on the same or different radio frequency (RF)
bands. We consider both the cases in this paper. The case in
which the same frequency band (channel) is used at both the
BSs occurs if the wireless network operates in an unlicensed
band; in such a case, BSs belonging to different networks (or
providers) may use the same RF band. We call this the single-
frequency case. If the wireless network operates in licensed
RF bands, two neighboring BSs would operate in disjoint RF
bands. We call this the two-frequencies case. We now discuss
the useful power collected and interference seen at a BS in
the single- and two-frequencies cases. For this purpose, it is
useful to define the following functions. Define
g(y) := [1 + y2]−α/2. (1)
For a set S ⊆ [−L,L] and candidate BS location x, define
E(x, S) :=
∫
S
g(y − x) dy. (2)
and Eo(x) := E(x, [−L,L]). The dependence of g, E, and
Eo on α is understood.
In the following we consider a CDMA system where BSs
perform single mobile decoding, i.e., while decoding any
mobile’s signal, they treat all other mobiles’ received signals as
interference. Subsequent descriptions of SINR-equilibrium and
hierarchical equilibrium are also for such a system. Analogous
notions for SIC decoding are defined in Sections V (single-
frequency case) and VI (two-frequencies case).
1) The single-frequency case: In this case, power from
all the mobiles is received at both the BSs. The total re-
ceived power at BS j located at xj is therefore given by
E(xj , [−L,L]) = Eo(xj). All of this received power will
clearly be interference to a mobile at y because the mobile’s
own contribution to this is infinitesimal.
With this interference interpretation for Eo(xj), we now
highlight some of its properties. It is straightforward to see
via change of variables that
Eo(x) =
∫ L−x
−L−x
g(y) dy =
∫ arctan(L−x)
arctan(−L−x)
(cos θ)α−2 dθ. (3)
Closed form expressions are available for Eo when α takes
integer values. In particular, for α = 2 we get
Eo(x) = arctan(L − x) + arctan(L+ x), (4)
3and for α = 1 we get
Eo(x) = arcsinh(L− x) + arcsinh(L+ x). (5)
The above expressions motivate the following definition of the
α-parametric function
arctanα (x) :=
∫ x
0
g(y) dy, x ∈ R.
Then clearly arctanα (·) is an odd function1 that is increasing,
differentiable with derivative g, and sigmoidal2. We may
therefore write the received power at location xj (and therefore
the interference in the single-frequency case) as
Eo(xj) = arctanα (L− xj) + arctanα (L+ xj) . (6)
The following is a useful property of Eo.
Proposition 2.1: Eo is an even function with a unique
maximum at 0. Moreover, Eo(|x|) monotonically decreases
with |x|.
Proof: See Appendix B.
2) The two-frequencies case: Unlike the previous setting,
in which the two BSs operate on the same RF band, in
the two-frequencies case the total interference at each BS
depends on the association decisions of the mobiles. Indeed,
the interference power at BS j is the total power received at
that BS from all mobiles that actually associate with it. The
total received power at BS j is thus given by E(xj , Aj).
For example, suppose A1 := [−L, θ] and A2 := (θ, L]
denote the two cells for some θ ∈ [−L,L]. Then the inter-
ference power at BS 1 is E(x1, A1) = arctanα (θ − x1) −
arctanα (−L− x1). The expression for E(x2, A2) is obtained
analogously.
B. SINR-equilibrium association
We shall first consider the case in which the BSs’ locations
are fixed, and each mobile has the option of associating with
one of the BSs. The continuum of mobiles constitute the
players in this association game.
Consider a mobile at location y. Its utility is a nondecreas-
ing function of the throughput density at y (see Appendix
A). The throughput density at y increases linearly with SINR
density. Thus, this mobile chooses a BS that yields the higher
SINR density at y. Let Ij be the set of interferers as seen at
BS j. If a mobile at point y is associated with BS j, the SINR
density for this mobile is
SINR(y, xj , Ij) :=
g(y − xj)
E(xj , Ij) + σ2
. (7)
A mobile at y ∈ [−L,L] will therefore prefer to associate with
BS 1 if SINR(y, x1, I1) ≥ SINR(y, x2, I2).
We observe that in the single-frequency case, Ij = [−L,L].
Thus, the SINR density for a location, as seen at BS j is
fixed. However, in the two-frequencies case, Ij = Aj , j = 1, 2.
1It is an odd function because arctanα (−x) = − arctanα (x).
2A function is sigmoidal, if it is non-decreasing, concave to the right of a
particular point called the inflection point and convex to its left. The second
derivative of arctanα (x) = g′(x) = −αx[1+x2]−(1+α/2). The inflection
point for arctanα (·) is therefore 0.
Hence, the SINR density for a location, as seen at BS j is a
function of the cell Aj .
Definition 2.1: The cell partition (A1, A2) is said to
be an SINR-equilibrium if the following holds: y ∈
A1 if SINR(y, x1, I1) > SINR(y, x2, I2) and only if
SINR(y, x1, I1) ≥ SINR(y, x2, I2). If SINR(y, x1, I1) =
SINR(y, x2, I2), y ∈ A1 or A2 arbitrarily.
Remark 2.1: This definition of equilibrium is similar to
the Wardrop equilibrium in road traffic [11], or the Nash
equilibrium in population games [12]. Note, however, that in
Wardrop equilibrium the utility of choosing a resource (a BS
in the present problem) depends on the set of users that make
the same choice through their total “number” (their fraction
or their mass). Extensions of the Wardrop concept exist to the
case where there is a finite number of user classes and the
utility of using a resource for a user in a given class depends
on the amount of users of each one of the classes who use that
resource [13]. In our problem, however, there is a continuum
of classes corresponding to the locations of the mobiles.
C. Hierarchical equilibrium
We shall also consider placement of BSs taking into account
the SINR-equilibrium that follows when mobiles associate to
maximize their SINR density. The two BSs play a location
game: BS j decides to place itself at (xj , 1) where xj ∈ R, j =
1, 2. The utility of a BS is a monotone function of the aggregate
throughput of all the mobiles associated with it. Since the
throughput density at location y increases linearly with SINR
density, we may simply set the integral of SINR density over
the cell of a BS as its utility. Thus for BS j with cell Aj and
interferers Ij , the utility is
1
2
∫
Aj
SINR(y, xj , Ij) dy =
1
2
∫
Aj
g(y − xj) dy
E(xj , Ij) + σ2
Once the BSs choose their locations, Aj , Ij , and thus the utility
of BS j are determined by the association game played by the
mobiles. We thus have a Stackelberg-like game [14] with the
lead players being the two BSs (who may either cooperate or
compete) and the followers the continuum of mobiles (who
compete to maximize their respective SINR densities). We
refer to this as the hierarchical equilibrium problem.
III. CDMA: THE SINGLE-FREQUENCY CASE
A. SINR-equilibrium association
We begin by providing closed form expressions for cell
boundaries in the SINR-equilibrium (see Definition 2.1). De-
fine the αth root of the ratio of the net interferences (including
thermal noise) at the two BSs to be
Bα(x1, x2) :=
(
Eo(x1) + σ
2
Eo(x2) + σ2
)1/α
.
We start by considering symmetric placements of BSs: |x1| =
|x2| which implies Bα(x1, x2) = 1. If x1 = x2 BSs are
indifferent to all the mobiles from the point of view of
SINR density. Hence (A, [−L,L]\A) for all A ⊂ [−L,L]
are SINR-equilibrium association profiles. If x1 = −x2 6= 0,
4mobiles associate with the BS which is closer. Hence either
([−L, 0], (0, L]) (if x1 < 0) or ([0, L]), [−L, 0)) (if x1 > 0)
is the unique SINR-equilibrium. To study the asymmetric
scenarios we assume, without loss of generality, that BS 2
is located closer to the origin than BS 1, i.e., |x1| > |x2| ≥ 0.
On account of Proposition 2.1, we have Bα(x1, x2) < 1.
Proposition 3.1: Let BS 1 be located at x1 and BS 2 at
x2 where |x1| > |x2| ≥ 0. The set of mobile locations that
connect to BS 2 is nonempty only if
τ := |x2 − x1| · Bα(x1, x2)
1−B2α(x1, x2)
≥ 1. (8)
If the inequality holds strictly then the set of locations that
connect to BS 2 is given by the interval3
x2 − x1B2α(x1, x2)
1−B2α(x1, x2)
+
(
−
√
τ2 − 1,
√
τ2 − 1
)
.
Proof: Mobiles that have a higher SINR density at x2
will connect to BS 2, i.e., y ∈ A2 if
[(y − x2)2 + 1]−α/2
Eo(x2) + σ2
>
[(y − x1)2 + 1]−α/2
Eo(x1) + σ2
which is equivalent to
(y − x2)2 + 1 <
(
(y − x1)2 + 1
)
B2α(x1, x2).
As B2α(x1, x2) < 1, the above inequality holds when a
convex quadratic function of y is strictly negative. The positive
discriminant condition straightforwardly yields that the set
connecting to BS 2 is nonempty only if (8) holds. The roots
of the convex quadratic equation are given by the ends of
the specified interval. Since the convex quadratic function
is strictly negative in the interval between the roots, all the
mobiles in this interval have higher SINR densities at BS 2.
When |x2| > |x1| ≥ 0, the roles of BS 1 and BS 2 are
switched: BS 1 sees more interference, its cell A1 may be
empty, and when nonempty, A1 is an interval.
We provide numerical results to illustrate some surprising
features of the SINR-equilibrium that distinguish this from
other association games (e.g., [4], [13]). We set L = 10 (so
that mobiles are concentrated over the interval [−10, 10]) and
the noise parameter σ = 0.3. We place BS 1 at one of the
fixed locations x1 where x1 = −10,−5,−2, 0. For each of
these, we vary the location of BS 2 from x2 = 0 to x2 =
30 (see Figure 1). The left column of plots corresponds to a
path loss exponent α = 2 and the right one to α = 1. The
equilibrium sets Aj turn out to have the form A1 = [θ1, θ2],
A2 = [−L, θ1) ∪ (θ2, L] for x1 = 0,−2, and A1 = [−L, θ2],
A2 = (θ2, L] for x1 = −5,−10. The top (respectively bottom)
row of plots depict the threshold θ2 (respectively θ1) as a
function of x2. See the following for more details.
1) Observations:
3The notation a+ (b, c) is short for the interval (a + b, a+ c).
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Fig. 1. Single-frequency case; SINR-equilibrium: Thresholds determining
the cell boundaries as a function of the location of BS 2 for various locations
of BS 1. The path loss exponent is 2 in the figures on the left and 1 in those
on the right.
a) Non-convex cells: For all the locations of BS 1, x1 =
−10,−5,−2, 0, mobiles in (θ2, L] have a better SINR density
at BS 2. Let us concentrate on the curves corresponding to
x1 = −2 in Figure 1. When BS 2 is located sufficiently far
to the right of the origin, the interference at BS 1 is large
compared to that at BS 2 (see Proposition 2.1). Thus, mobiles
sufficiently far away and to the left of BS 1 (those in [−L, θ1))
also have a better SINR density at BS 2 despite BS 2 being
the farther BS. Thus, in this case, A2 = [−L, θ1) ∪ (θ2, L], a
non-convex set. A2 is similarly non-convex when x1 = 0 and
x2 is sufficiently far to the right (or left).
0 10 20 30 40−5
−4
−3
−2
−1
0
1
x2
θ 2
 
fo
r α
 
=
 
2
 
 
x1=−8
x1=−10
Fig. 2. Single-frequency case; SINR-equilibrium: Upper cell boundary of
cell A1 as a function of the location of BS 2 for various locations of BS 1.
b) Non-monotonicity of the cell boundaries: We observe
a surprising non-monotonicity of the threshold θ2 as a function
of the location x2 of BS 2. θ2 first increases with x2 until about
5x2 = 8, then it decreases with x2 until around x2 = 14; finally,
for larger x2, θ2 again increases. Analogous non-monotonicity
is observed in θ1 too (in the the curves corresponding to x1 =
−2, 0 and α = 2).
The dashed line in Figure 2 shows a zoomed-in view of the
x1 = −10 case of the top-left plot of Figure 1. The threshold
θ2 increases beyond 0 until x2 is about 8 units to the right of
the origin, and then returns to 0 when x2 = 10. This can be
understood as follows. Clearly, for x2 = 10 the interferences
at both the BSs are the same; hence θ2 = 0, the midpoint. Now
imagine moving BS 2 a little to the left (i.e., decreasing x2).
Now |x2| < |x1|. Thus, from Proposition 2.1, the interference
Eo(x2) at BS 2 is larger than Eo(x1), the interference at BS 1.
This makes it advantageous for mobiles a little to the right of
the origin also to associate with BS 1; hence θ2 increases as
x2 decreases from x2 = 10. Further decrease in x2 brings
BS 2 closer to mobiles on the negative x-axis, thus ultimately
causing θ2 to return to 0, and even cross below 0, as x2
decreases further. As x2 increases beyond 10, the interference
perceived by it decreases, thus making it advantageous for
mobiles a little to the left of the origin also to associate with
BS 2; hence θ2 decreases as x2 increases beyond x2 = 10.
Once BS 2 is moved far from the region where the mobiles
exist, the signal power to x2 becomes smaller, and association
with BS 1 becomes increasingly better for mobiles to the right
of the origin, causing θ2 to increase.
The top row of plots in Figure 1 suggests that θ2 is perhaps
monotone in the position of BS 1. But this is not true because
a closer look at the θ2 curves in Figure 2 for x1 = −10,−8
shows that they cross each other several times.
2) Discussion: The form of equilibria displayed in the
SINR-association examples is unusual in the class of location
games. The reason for the unusual features lies in the SINR
criterion, as we describe now.
• If a mobile is very close to a BS, path gain from the
mobile to the BS will be very high. Thus, the mobile
connects to this BS, even if the interference suffered by
this BS is relatively higher.
• If a mobile is located sufficiently far from both BSs, then
the relative difference in the powers received at the BSs
will be small. Thus the mobile will prefer to connect to
BS that suffers from less interference.
• If a mobile is at moderate distance from both the BSs,
it takes into account both the factors (i) path gains to
the BSs and (ii) interferences suffered by the BSs, while
making its association decision.
B. Hierarchical equilibrium
Single base station: Suppose there is only one BS. Given
that the interference is maximum at the origin and decreases
monotonically with distance from the origin, where should it
be placed to maximize utility? The utility of the BS, when
placed at x, is given by
1
2
∫ L
−L
g(y − x)
Eo(x) + σ2
dy =
1
2
Eo(x)
Eo(x) + σ2
which is maximized when Eo(x) is maximized, i.e., at x = 0.
Despite the high interference, the origin is the best location to
maximize the utility given the nature of the utility function.
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Fig. 3. Single-frequency case; Utility of BS 2 as a function of its location
when we position BS 1 at x1 = −10.
Two base stations, utility behavior: Figure 3 portrays
the effect of cell boundaries on utility. BS 1 is located at
x1 = −10. The utility of BS 2 as a function of its location
is then plotted. For x2 ≪ −10, mobiles at the farthest right
connect to BS 2. For x2 approximately in the interval -11 to
-10, an interval in the left most extreme of [−10, 10] also
joins BS 2 so that BS 2 cell partition is a union of two
intervals. Consequently, the utility increases in this interval.
At x2 = −10 a sudden transition occurs where all nodes in
the middle interval switch to BS2, and hence the discontinuity
in the utility. For −10 < x2 < 10 nodes in an interval join
BS 2, and this eventually becomes a half infinite line with
boundary moving to the right as x2 becomes large.
1) Two cooperating base stations: We now consider opti-
mal joint placement of two BSs to maximize the sum utility.
It can be shown that in a hierarchical optimal configuration
the two BSs are placed on the opposite sides of the origin.
Furthermore, the corresponding cells are of the form [−L, a]
and (a, L], and are characterized by a single parameter a. See
Appendix C for justifications. While the exact characterization
of a remains open, simulations indicate that sum utility is
maximized when a = 0 and −x1 = x2, i.e., the BSs
are equidistant from the origin. We call such a placement
as symmetric. The SINR-equilibrium cells under symmetric
placement are [−L, 0] and (0, L].
Remark 3.1: The optimal configuration should also be an
SINR-equilibrium association profile implying that for a user
at a, SINR densities seen at BS 1 and BS 2 must match, i.e.,
g(a− x1)
Eo(x1) + σ2
=
g(a− x2)
Eo(x2) + σ2
.
Note that the symmetric configuration with boundary a = 0
and −x1 = x2 satisfies this condition.
Figure 4 depicts the utility obtained by each BS for sym-
metric placement −x1 = x2 = x, as a function of x. We see
that the origin and the extreme points (at distance 10 from
the origin) are suboptimal locations. We also observe that the
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Fig. 4. Single-frequency case; cooperating BSs; symmetric placement of
BSs at ±x: Plot of utility obtained by each BS vs. x; here L = 10, α = 2
and σ takes the values 0.4, 1, and 2.
performance close to the optimal location is quite robust to
perturbations of BS locations.
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Fig. 5. Single-frequency case; cooperating BSs; symmetric placement of
BSs: Optimal symmetric distance from origin for two BSs, as a function of
thermal noise standard deviation.
Further experimentation revealed that, as σ is increased,
optimal distance of the BSs from the origin decreases (see
Figure 5). As σ →∞, the optimal symmetric locations of the
BSs converge to -5 and 5. This is expected because at very
large σ, interference does not play any role, and the BSs should
be placed to maximize the total power collected from the
respective cells, E(x, (0, L])+E(−x, [−L, 0]). Proposition 2.1
says that this is maximized by choosing x and −x to be the
mid-points of the respective intervals, i.e., x = L/2, which is
5 in our example.
2) Two non-cooperating base stations: We now consider
a non-cooperative game between the two BSs. The BSs act
simultaneously and pick their locations to maximize their
respective utilities.
Figure 6 has on the horizontal axis the location of BS 2 and
on the vertical axis the utility it achieves. The figure is obtained
for L = 10, σ = 0.3, α = 2. There are four curves that
correspond to four locations of BS 1: x1 = −2,−5,−8,−10.
From these curves, one can conclude that the utility of BS 2
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Fig. 6. Single-frequency case; non-cooperating BSs: Utility of BS 2 as
a function of its location when we position BS 1 at x1 where x1 =
−2,−5,−8,−10.
is quite robust to placement errors around the best response
location, for the indicated values of BS 1 locations.
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Fig. 7. Single-frequency case; non-cooperating BSs: The best response of
BS 2 when BS 1 is at a distance indicated by abscissa to the left of the origin.
Figure 7 shows the best response of BS 2 to a BS 1 location.
BS 1 is moved along the segment to left of the origin. In
the figure the horizontal axis is −x1, distance of BS 1 from
the origin. A positive best response value indicates a location
on the other side of the origin away from BS 1. Numerical
computations indicate the existence of a unique symmetric
equilibrium at −x1 = x2 = 7.36.
In Table I we compare the optimal location of the coopera-
tive case and the equilibrium location of the non-cooperative
case, as a function of σ. We observe that at the non-cooperative
equilibrium, the BSs are closer than at the cooperative op-
timum, i.e., placements are more aggressive. An analytical
proof of this observation remains an interesting open problem.
In both cooperative and non-cooperative cases the distances
decrease in σ and tend to a limit which is −x1 = x2 = 5
for the cooperative case and −x1 = x2 = 4.06 for the non-
cooperative case.
7TABLE I
OPTIMAL COOPERATIVE AND NON-COOPERATIVE PLACEMENTS OF BSS
AS A FUNCTION OF σ
σ 0.1 0.4 1 2 40
Optimum distance
of BSs from 0 8.658 7.745 6.435 5.591 5.002
(cooperative)
Equilibrium distance
of BSs from 0 8.10 6.95 5.50 4.667 4.09
(non-cooperative)
IV. CDMA: THE TWO-FREQUENCIES CASE
A. SINR-equilibrium association
We study the properties of the SINR-equilibrium partition
and arrive at a numerical method to compute it. The case where
BSs are collocated, i.e., x1 = x2, is trivial. Let us assume that
x1 6= x2. Recall that the interference at BS j in the two-
frequencies case is E(xj , Aj). As in Section III-A, define B
to be the αth root of the ratio of the net interferences at the
two BSs, i.e.,
B :=
[
E(x1, A1) + σ
2
E(x2, A2) + σ2
]1/α
.
Note that B ∈ [Bmin, Bmax], where
Bmin =
[
σ2
Eo(x2) + σ2
]1/α
and Bmax =
[
Eo(x1) + σ
2
σ2
]1/α
.
A location y ∈ A2 if
g(y − x2)
E(x2, A2) + σ2
>
g(y − x1)
E(x1, A1) + σ2
,
⇐⇒ (y − x2)2 + 1 <
(
(y − x1)2 + 1
)
B2. (9)
First consider B < 1. Proceeding exactly as in the proof of
Proposition 3.1, we get A2 to be the set of y such that a convex
quadratic function of y is negative. Thus A2 is an interval and
its complement A1 a union of at most two intervals. More
precisely, the boundaries are given as follows. Define
τ(B) := |x1 − x2| ·
∣∣∣∣ B1−B2
∣∣∣∣ .
If τ(B) ≤ 1, A2 is empty, B2 = (E(x1, A1) + σ2)/σ2 > 1,
a contradiction. Thus τ(B) > 1 and A2 is determined by the
interval (as in the proof of Proposition 3.1)
(g1(B), g2(B))
:=
x2 − x1B2
1−B2 +
(
−
√
τ(B)2 − 1,
√
τ(B)2 − 1
)
.
This gives expressions for the end points of intervals that make
up A1 and A2 in terms of B. In particular,4
A1 = [−L, ⌊g1(B)⌋−L) ∪ (⌈g2(B)⌉L, L],
A2 = [⌊g1(B)⌋−L, ⌈g2(B)⌉L].
Similar analysis could be done for B > 1. In this case, it can
be shown that
A1 = [⌊g1(B)⌋−L, ⌈g2(B)⌉L],
A2 = [−L, ⌊g1(B)⌋−L) ∪ (⌈g2(B)⌉L, L],
4⌈m⌉L = min{m,L}, ⌊m⌋−L = max{m,−L}, and [m]L−L =
min{max{m,−L}, L}
where g1(B), g2(B), and τ(B) are the same as defined above.
Finally for B = 1, (9) implies
A1 =
[
−L,
[
x1 + x2
2
]L
−L
]
and A2 =
[[
x1 + x2
2
]L
−L
, L
]
.
To emphasize that A1 and A2 depend only on B, we write
A1(B) and A2(B). At SINR-equilibrium, therefore, B must
be a solution to the fixed point equation
B =
[
E(x1, A1(B)) + σ
2
E(x2, A2(B)) + σ2
]1/α
=: F (B). (10)
Theorem 4.1: The fixed point equation F (B) = B has a
unique solution.
Proof: We first prove that E(x1, A1(B)) and
E(x2, A2(B)) are continuous in B. By inspection, g1(B)
and g2(B) are continuous for all B 6= 1. Straightforward
calculations show that g1(B)→ (x1+x2)/2 and g2(B)→∞
as B ↑ 1, while g1(B) → −∞ and g2(B) → (x1 + x2)/2
as B ↓ 1. So the boundaries of A1(B) and A2(B), after
restriction to [−L,L], are continuous in B in [Bmin, Bmax].
Thus E(x1, A1(B)) and E(x2, A2(B)) (see (2)) and therefore
F (B) are continuous functions of B in [Bmin, Bmax].
Next we show that F (B) is a decreasing function of B. Let
B ≤ 1. We observe that if a y satisfies (9) for some value of
B, it will do so also for any larger value of B in [Bmin, 1].
Thus, A2(B) is an increasing set function (order is specified
by inclusion relation), and A1(B) is a decreasing set function.
For B > 1, a similar argument shows that with B′ = 1/B,
A1(B
′) is increasing in B′, and A2(B′) is decreasing in B′. So
A1(B) and A2(B) are decreasing and increasing set functions
respectively, for B in [1, Bmax] as well. Obviously E(·, A)
strictly increases as A ⊂ [−L,L] increases. Hence F (B) is a
decreasing function of B for B in [Bmin, Bmax].
Finally, from (10), we see that F (B) ∈ [Bmin, Bmax]. Thus
there is a unique fixed point of the equation F (B) = B.
As a simple example, consider the symmetric case when
−x1 = x2 6= 0. It is easy to verify that B = 1, and the
unique equilibrium partition is ([−L, 0], (0, L]) if x1 < 0 and
([0, L], [−L, 0)) if x1 > 0.
For an integer α ≥ 1, (10) can be written as an implicit
equation in B as
Bα =
[arctanα(L− x1)− arctanα(⌈g2(B)⌉L − x1)
+ arctanα(⌊g1(B)⌋−L − x1)− arctanα(−L− x1) + σ2
]
arctanα(⌈g2(B)⌉L − x2)− arctanα(⌊g1(B)⌋−L − x2) + σ2 .
We may numerically search for a B that solves the above
equation through a suitably fine quantization of the specified
interval.
Remark 4.1: Suppose B∗ solves the fixed point equa-
tion (10). B∗ < 1 implies that, at equilibrium, BS 2 has more
interference than BS 1, and thus A2 is a connected subset of
[−L,L]. B∗ > 1 implies that, at equilibrium, BS 1 has more
interference than BS 2, and thus A1 is a connected subset of
[−L,L].
Figure 8 illustrates the existence and uniqueness of fixed
points. We set L = 10, the path loss exponent α = 2 and the
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Fig. 8. Two-frequencies case; F(B) vs B. Figure illustrates the existence and
uniqueness of fixed points.
noise parameter σ = 0.3. Two curves are shown: one corre-
sponding to (x1, x2) = (0, 10) and the other corresponding to
(x1, x2) = (10, 0). For both the cases F (B) is monotonically
decreasing and cuts the line y = x at unique points. In the
first case, the fixed point is B = 1.393: at equilibrium, BS 1
has more interference than BS 2. In the diagonally opposite
second case, the fixed point B = 0.718 (= 1/1.393).
We also provide an algorithm to obtain the fixed point.
Define d := |x1 − x2|/2, βmin :=
√
d2 + 1 − d and
βmax :=
√
d2 + 1 + d. Then, for B < 1, τ(B) > 1 implies
B ∈ (βmin, 1]. Similarly, for B > 1, τ(B) > 1 implies that
B ∈ [1, βmax). From an earlier discussion, the fixed point lies
in (βmin, βmax). It can also be verified that F ′(B) → −∞
as B → βmin or βmax and is finite otherwise. Thus a fixed
point iteration of the form Bn+1 = F (Bn) (see (10)) may
not converge. Motivated by [15], we propose a variant of this
iteration which always converges to the desired fixed point.
See Appendix D for the algorithm and its analysis.
We illustrate the form of SINR-equilibrium via some numer-
ical results. We set L = 10, the path loss exponent α = 2 and
the noise parameter σ = 0.3. We place BS 1 at one of the fixed
locations x1 where x1 = −10,−5,−2, 0. For each of these,
we vary the location of BS 2 from x2 = 0 to x2 = 30 (see
Figure 9). As in single frequency case, the equilibrium sets
Aj have the form A1 = [θ1, θ2], A2 = [−L, θ1) ∪ (θ2, L]
for x1 = 0,−2, and A1 = [−L, θ2], A2 = (θ2, L] for
x1 = −5,−10. The left (respectively right) plot depicts the
threshold θ1 (respectively θ2) as a function of x2.
B. Hierarchical equilibrium
1) Two cooperating base stations: The goal here is to place
the two BSs so that the sum utility is maximized.
Proposition 4.1: The locations −x1 = x2 = L/2 with
SINR-equilibrium cell partition (A1, A2) = ( [−L, 0], (0, L] )
maximizes the sum utility.
Proof: For a given pair of locations x1 and x2, let
(A1, A2) be the SINR-equilibrium cell partition. For conve-
nience let uj := E(xj , Aj), j = 1, 2, be the received power
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Fig. 9. Two frequencies case; SINR-equilibrium: Thresholds determining the
cell boundaries as a function of the location of BS 2 for various locations of
BS 1.
at BS j. Then the sum utility satisfies the following:
2∑
j=1
1
2
uj
uj + σ2
≤ (u1 + u2)/2
(u1 + u2)/2 + σ2
(11)
≤ umax/2
umax/2 + σ2
(12)
=
E(L/2, [0, L])
E(L/2, [0, L]) + σ2
(13)
where (11) follows from Jensen’s inequality because the
function u/(u + σ2) is concave in u; inequality (12) follows
because the function u/2u/2+σ2 is monotone increasing in u
with umax the maximum sum of received energies across
any partition (not just SINR-equilibrium partitions). The last
equality (13) follows from Proposition E.1 in Appendix E.
The upper bound is independent of x1 and x2, and is achieved
when −x1 = x2 = L/2. The corresponding intervals indeed
constitute an SINR-equilibrium cell partition.
2) Two non-cooperating base stations: We now consider
the hierarchical game where the BSs compete with each other
keeping in mind their individual utilities as in Section III-B2.
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Fig. 10. Two frequencies case; non-cooperating BSs: Utility of BS 2
as a function of its location when we position BS 1 at x1 where x1 =
−2,−5,−8,−10.
Figure 10 has on the horizontal axis the location x2 of
BS 2 and on the vertical axis the utility it achieves. The
figure is obtained for L = 10, σ = 0.3, α = 2. There
are four curves that correspond to four locations of BS 1:
x1 = −2,−5,−8,−10. From these curves, one can conclude
9that the utility of BS 2 is quite robust to placement errors
around the best response location, for the indicated values of
BS 1 locations. Figure 11 yields the best response for BS 2
given BS 1’s placement. Given a BS 1 location, the higher
interference cell and the equilibrium ratio B are first found
as discussed in Section IV-A, for each possible location of
BS 2. Then the BS 2 location yielding the maximum utility
is identified as the best response location and is plotted in the
figure.
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Fig. 11. Two frequencies case; non-cooperating BSs: The best response of
BS 2 when BS 1 at a distance indicated by abscissa to the left of the origin.
A positive best response indicates a location on the other side of BS 1.
Numerical results indicate that there is a unique symmetric
equilibrium for the chosen parameters at −x1 = x2 = 4.1. The
corresponding SINR-equilibrium cell partition is A1 = [−L, 0]
and A2 = (0, L]. Note that any unilateral deviation will
change the cell boundaries and yield lesser utility to the
deviating BS. If the BSs were cooperative, the best locations
are −x1 = x2 = 5. However, this latter set of locations is
not an equilibrium under competition. We also performed nu-
merical computations for other values of noise variance, e.g.,
σ = 0.1, 1, 2. It is observed that the equilibrium BS locations
are insensitive to the value of σ. Yet again, we observe in our
numerical examples that placements are more aggressive (i.e.,
BSs are closer to each other) under competition.
V. SIC: THE SINGLE-FREQUENCY CASE
We now extend our study to incorporate the effect of em-
ploying SIC decoding by the BSs. For model description, see
Appendix A. In this section, we consider the single frequency
case where mobiles connected to BS 1 cause interference at
BS 2 and vice-versa.
A. SINR-equilibrium association
We first study the properties of the SINR-equilibrium parti-
tion. The SINR density seen at BS j, for a mobile at y ∈ Aj ,
can range from g(y−xj)Eo(xj)+σ2 to
g(y−xj)
Eo(xj)−E(xj ,Aj)+σ2
, depending
on the BS’s decoding order. We assume that each mobile
first associates with a BS. The BSs then choose an arbitrary
decoding order. In the absence of a clear policy for choosing
the decoding order at the BSs, we assume that the mobiles at
y associate to BS 2 only if
g(y − x2)
E(x2, A1) + σ2
≥ g(y − x1)
E(x1, A2) + σ2
.
We may interpret this as an association where a mobile
optimistically believes that it will be decoded last (at the BS
with which it is associated) and therefore expects to see an
SINR density g(y−xj)(Eo(xj)−E(xj ,Aj)+σ2) with BS j. Without loss
of generality, relabel indices so that
B :=
[
E(x1, A2) + σ
2
E(x2, A1) + σ2
]1/α
≤ 1.
The above condition can be rewritten as
(y − x2)2 + 1 ≤
(
(y − x1)2 + 1
)
B2,
where B2 ≤ 1.
The condition governing the structure of the SINR-
equilibrium partition has the same form as the one in
Section III-A. As before, the cell partition (A1, A2) =
([−L, 0], (0, L]) is an SINR-equilibrium with B = 1 in the
symmetric case when −x1 = x2.
Numerical computations show that there can be more
than one SINR-equilibrium partitions for a pair of BS lo-
cations (x1, x2). To illustrate this phenomenon, assume that
all the mobiles are associated with BS 1. A mobile’s antici-
pated SINR densities at the two BSs would be g(y−x1)σ2 and
g(y−x2)
Eo(x2)+σ2
respectively. It does not switch to BS 2 if
g(y − x2)
Eo(x2) + σ2
<
g(y − x1)
σ2
.
Thus all mobiles keep their associations if
g(y − x2)
g(y − x1) < 1 +
Eo(x2)
σ2
, ∀ y ∈ [−L,L].
This makes ([−L,L], ∅) an SINR-equilibrium partition. Sim-
ilarly one can argue that (∅, [−L,L]) is also an SINR-
equilibrium partition if
g(y − x1)
g(y − x2) < 1 +
Eo(x1)
σ2
, ∀ y ∈ [−L,L].
If the noise variance σ2 is sufficiently small, both conditions
can hold and hence both ([−L,L], ∅) and (∅, [−L,L]) are
SINR-equilibrium partitions.
Remark 5.1: The above discussion illustrates an interesting
capture phenomenon, which is of interest if the two BSs are
placed sequentially, i.e., a Stackelberg game is played. The
BS being placed first can judiciously place itself, to capture a
majority of the mobiles.
B. Hierarchical equilibrium
BS 1 and BS 2 choose their respective locations coopera-
tively. Each BS then employs SIC decoding for all mobiles
in its cell. From the discussion in Appendix A, the utility of
BS 1 is 12 log
(
1 + E(x1,A1)E(x1,A2)+σ2
)
, independent of the decoding
order. A similar expression is obtained for the utility of BS 2.
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Two cooperating base stations: In the cooperative case, if
σ2 ≈ 0, it is nearly optimal if all mobiles can associate to
one BS. This is because if there is a non-zero population
of mobiles connected to one BS, it generates a non-zero
interference to the other BS. On the other hand, with all the
mobiles associated to one of the BSs, say BS 1, the sum utility
1
2 log
(
1 + E
o(x1)
σ2
)
→ ∞ when σ2 → 0. So BS 2 should be
placed very far away so that its cell is nearly empty. Symmetric
placements are therefore not optimal in general. However, as
σ → ∞, interference from the other BS no longer plays a
role. As in the single mobile decoding scenario, BSs should
be placed to maximize the total power collected from their
respective cells. Thus symmetric locations −x1 = x2 = L2
become optimal.
Recall that there can be multiple SINR-equilibria for a given
pair of BSs locations. Thus for the case of non-cooperating
BSs, the competitive equilibria are not well defined. We do
not pursue their study in this work.
C. Pessimistically behaving mobiles
In the absence of a clear policy for choosing the decoding
order at the BSs, mobiles might also think pessimistically,
i.e., each mobile makes an association decision assuming that
it will be decoded first (at the BS with which it associates)
and therefore expects to see an SINR density g(y−xj)(Eo(xj)+σ2) with
BS j. This is the same SINR-density as observed in the case
of single mobile decoding. Hence for given BS placements,
SINR-equilibrium partition will be identical to that in the case
of single mobile decoding (Section III-A).
For cooperating BSs, hierarchical equilibrium will be asym-
metric in general as in the case of optimistic mobiles. When
BSs are selfish, BS 1 is interested in optimizing
1
2
log
(
1 +
E(x1, A1)
E(x1, A2) + σ2
)
=
1
2
log

1 + E(x1,A1)Eo(x1)+σ2
1− E(x1,A1)Eo(x1)+σ2

 . (14)
This is equivalent to optimizing E(x1,A1)Eo(x1)+σ2 which is the
utility of BS 1 if single mobile decoding is employed. In
the single mobile decoding case numerical examples indicate
that there is a hierarchical equilibrium with symmetric BS
placements, say −x1 = x1 = x∗, and cell partition (A1, A2) =
([−L, 0], (0, L]) (Section III-B2). Clearly, the same is a hier-
archical equilibrium in the case of SIC decoding as well. For a
BS, the aggregate equilibrium utilities corresponding to single
mobile decoding and SIC decoding, are related as in (14).
Remark 5.2: Having discussed the two extreme decoding
order beliefs, we are naturally led to the following interesting
problem. What decoding policy should a BS advertise in order
to maximize its utility? Recall that given an association profile,
a BS’s utility does not depend on what decoding order it
actually follows. But the advertisement will affect the SINR-
equilibrium and thus the utility. We leave this as an open
problem for future research.
VI. SIC: THE TWO-FREQUENCIES CASE
We now proceed to the two-frequencies case where the BSs
employ SIC decoding. We give a complete characterization of
both cooperative and competitive equilibria.
A. SINR-equilibrium association
In the two frequencies case, the SINR density seen at BS j,
for a mobile at y ∈ Aj , can range from g(y−xj)E(xj ,Aj)+σ2 to
g(y−xj)
σ2 , depending on the BS’s decoding order. As before,
we assume that each mobile first associates with a BS. The
BSs then choose an arbitrary decoding order. In the absence
of a clear policy for choosing the decoding order at the BSs,
an optimistic mobile believes that it will be decoded last and
therefore expects to see an SINR density of g(y−xj)/σ2 with
BS j. This being monotonically decreasing in the distance
|y−xj|, the mobile simply associates to the nearest BS. If the
BSs are collocated, then either BS is chosen arbitrarily. Define
v = (x1+ x2)/2. Then, the equilibrium cell partition is A1 =
[−L, v], A2 = (v, L] if x1 < x2, A1 = [v, L], A2 = [−L, v)
if x1 > x2, and an arbitrary choice at every y if x1 = x2.
B. Hierarchical equilibrium
In the two frequencies case, BS j’s utility with SIC decoding
is 12 log(1 +
E(xj,Aj)
σ2 ), j = 1, 2 (see Appendix A).
1) Two cooperating base stations: In this case, the two BSs
cooperate to maximize sum utility.
Theorem 6.1: Consider the two-frequencies case with two
cooperating BSs that employ SIC decoding. The BS locations
that maximize sum throughput are −x1 = x2 = L/2.
Proof: Recall the notation used in the proof of Proposi-
tion 4.1 where uj = E(xj , Aj). The sum throughput may be
upper bounded as
2∑
j=1
1
2
log
(
1 +
uj
σ2
)
≤ log
(
1 +
u1 + u2
2σ2
)
≤ log
(
1 +
umax
σ2
)
= log(1 +
E(L/2, (0, L])
σ2
).
where the first inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality,
while the second follows as in the proof of Proposition 4.1,
and the third follows from Proposition E.1. Finally, the upper
bound is attained at −x1 = x2 = L/2 with cell partition
( [−L, 0], (0, L] ). This completes the proof.
Consider now a case where the BSs are constrained to be
collocated at x. Recall that mobiles pick one or the other BS
with equal probability, so that the power collected at each
BS is Eo(x)/2 yielding a sum utility log
(
1 + E
o(x)
2σ2
)
. This
attains its maximum when Eo does, which is at x = 0 (see
Proposition 2.1).
2) Two non-cooperating base stations: In this case, the two
BSs play a non-cooperative game to maximize their respective
utilities. Define a := 22/α. For α ∈ [1,∞), we have a ∈ (1, 4].
Recall that if the two BSs are not collocated, the cell boundary
is (x1+x2)/2. Let rj(x1, x2) be the power collected by BS j.
The utility of each BS is a monotone function of the power
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collected, and we may therefore assume that BS j’s goal is to
maximize rj(x1, x2). Let BR2(x1) be the set of best responses
of BS 2 to x1, i.e.,
BR2(x1) = argmax
x2
r2(x1, x2)
Define BR1(x2) analogously.
Lemma 6.1: (i) For all x1, BR2(x1) ⊆ [−L,L]. An analo-
gous conclusion holds for BR1(x2).
(ii) If (x1, x2) is an equilibrium strategy profile, then x1, x2 ∈
[−L,L].
Proof: We consider the following three cases
1) If x1 ∈ (−∞,−L), then r2(x1,−L) = Eo(L). On the
other hand if |x2| > L, then r2(x1, x2) ≤ Eo(x2) <
Eo(L). Thus if an x2 /∈ [−L,L], then x2 /∈ BR2(x1).
2) If x1 ∈ [−L,L], then
r2(x1,−L) > r2(x1, x2), ∀x2 ∈ (−∞,−L),
and r2(x1, L) > r2(x1, x2), ∀x2 ∈ (L,∞).
Thus if an x2 ∈ (−∞,−L) ∪ (L,∞), then x2 /∈
BR2(x1).
3) If x1 ∈ (L,∞), then r2(x1, L) = Eo(L). On the other
hand if |x2| > L, then r2(x1, x2) ≤ Eo(x2) < Eo(L).
Thus if an x2 /∈ [−L,L], then x2 /∈ BR2(x1).
Similar arguments hold for BR1(x2) also.
The second part follows immediately once we recognize
that (x1, x2) is an equilibrium strategy profile if and only if
x1 ∈ BR1(x2) and x2 ∈ BR2(x1).
Thus, for equilibrium analysis, we only need to focus on
x1, x2 ∈ [−L,L]. For x1, x2 ∈ [−L,L], r2(x1, x2) is as
given in Table II, with a similar table for r1(x1, x2) of BS 1.
Interestingly, the function r2(x1, ·) as a function of x2 is
discontinuous at x2 = x1 unless x1 = 0. A similar observation
holds for r1(·, x2). Next we show that in an equilibrium, the
TABLE II
POWER RECEIVED AT BS 2: x1 ∈ [−L,L]
x2 ∈ r2(x1, x2)
[−L,x1) arctanα
(
x1−x2
2
)
+ arctanα (L+ x2)
{x1} Eo(x1)/2
(x1, L] arctanα (L− x2) + arctanα
(
x2−x1
2
)
two BSs are placed on the opposite sides of the origin.
Lemma 6.2: If x1 < 0, then BR2(x1) > x1. Similarly, if
x1 > 0, then BR2(x1) < x1. Analogous conclusions hold for
BR1(x2) also.
Proof: Let x1 < 0. If x1 < −L, the result follows from
Lemma 6.1. For −L ≤ x1 < 0
r2(x1, x
+
1 ) > r2(x1, x1),
and r2(x1,−x2) > r2(x1, x2), ∀x2 < x1.
See Table II to verify the first claim above. The second one
follows since mobiles associate to the nearest BS. These two
imply that if x2 ≤ x1, then x2 /∈ BR2(x1). This is the desired
result. Similarly one can argue for x1 > 0, and subsequently
for BR1(x2).
Corollary 6.1: If (x1, x2) is an equilibrium strategy profile,
then either (i) x1 ∈ [−L, 0], x2 ∈ [0, L], or (ii) x1 ∈
[0, L], x2 ∈ [−L, 0].
Proof: If x1 = 0, there is nothing to prove. First let
x1 ∈ [−L, 0). The above lemma implies that x2  x1, because
x2 = BR2(x1) > x1. Moreover, x2 /∈ (x1, 0), because x1 =
BR1(x2) > x2 for x2 < 0. Thus x2 ∈ [0, L]. Case (ii) is
similarly handled.
We now characterize all the equilibria.
Theorem 6.2: (i) For L ≤ √a− 1, there exists a unique
equilibrium at x1 = x2 = 0.
(ii) For L > √a− 1, there exists a unique equilibrium (up to a
permutation) at −x1 = x2 = 1a−1
(
−L+√aL2 − (a− 1)2).
Proof: See Appendix F.
Remark 6.1: (i) The equilibria locations do not depend
on σ. A similar insensitivity observation was made for the
equilibria in single mobile decoding case (Section IV-B2).
(ii) Note that
−L+√aL2 − (a− 1)2
a− 1 <
−L+
√
aL2
a− 1 =
L√
a+ 1
<
L
2
.
Again, as already seen in Sections III-B2 and IV-B2 for the
case of single mobile decoding, the competitive equilibrium
locations of BSs are closer to each other than the optimal
locations under cooperation.
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Fig. 12. SIC two frequencies case: r2(x1, x2) as a function of location x2
of BS2 for three fixed locations of BS1: x1 = −1,−5,−10. Here L = 10
and α = 1 (left) and α = 2 (right).
Figure 12 plots the received power at BS 2 given by
r2(x1, x2) as a function of location x2 for three fixed locations
of BS 1: x1 = −1,−5,−10. Here L = 10 and α = 1 (left) and
α = 2 (right). Both satisfy L ≥ √α− 1. A clear best response
location x2 is seen for each fixed x1. As BS 1 approaches the
origin, the best response location of BS 2 moves further away
from the origin.
3) Convergence to equilibrium: We consider the best re-
sponse dynamics in which the location of each of the two
BSs is sequentially adjusted.
Theorem 6.3: Let L >
√
a− 1. Assume that BSs follow the
best response dynamics to adjust their positions. Then, starting
from arbitrary initial positions xo1 and xo2, the best response
sequence converges to the unique equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix G.
As an example, consider L = 10 and α = 2, i.e., a = 2.
The equilibrium locations of the BSs are at a distance of 4.107
12
from the origin. Figure 13 illustrates the fast convergence of
dynamics from the starting locations ±5 to the equilibrium
locations.
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Fig. 13. SIC two frequencies case: non-cooperative BSs; Convergence of
the best response dynamics for BS 2.
Remark 6.2: When mobiles behave pessimistically, i.e.,
each mobile makes its association decision assuming that it
will be decoded first (at the BS with which it associates),
SINR-equilibrium and hierarchical equilibrium results are
identical to those for the single mobile decoding in the two-
frequencies case given in Section IV. (See the discussion in
Section V-C for a justification in the single-frequency case).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We studied combined BS placements and mobile associa-
tions in a game-setting where the utilities were determined
by SINR criteria. We saw that the SINR-equilibrium cells
exhibited non-monotonicity and non-convexity properties that
are not seen in the classical location game problems. These
unusual properties arise because the SINR density that de-
termines association is a function of the distance between
a mobile and the BS it is associated with and also the BS
location. We studied hierarchical equilibria in the CDMA
single-frequency and two-frequencies cases. We saw evidence
(via simulations in the CDMA single-frequency case and via
analysis in the other case) of a unique optimal pair of locations
in the cooperative scenario. We also saw evidence of a unique
equilibrium pair of locations (up to permutation) in the com-
petitive scenario. For the SIC single-frequency case, we made
some interesting observations. For the SIC two-frequencies
case, we completely characterized the optimal cooperative
locations and all competitive equilibria. Interestingly, in all
scenarios considered, the BS locations are closer to each
other in the competitive case than in the cooperative case,
an observation whose proof has eluded us.
APPENDIX A
PROPAGATION, PATH LOSS, AND FLUID MODELS
Propagation model: A mobile transmitter is modeled
as a point source that radiates in two-dimensional space or
three-dimensional space. The wavefronts emanating from the
point source are circular (respectively, spherical in three-
dimensional space). We assume that the far field model holds
and that antenna couplings between neighboring transmitters
and between transmitters and receiver are negligible, even in
the limit as mobiles get closer to each other.
Path loss model: Under the far-field model for propa-
gation in two dimensions with circular wavefronts, a receiver
at a distance r from the point source and having aperture arc
width s≪ r will capture only s/(2πr) of the total transmitted
power, so that propagation loss is proportional to 1/r. If there
is further dissipation in the medium (analogous to shadowing
and scattering of electromagnetic waves in three dimensions)
we model the propagation loss as proportional to 1/rα, where
α ≥ 1. The path loss model 1/rα for three dimensional
propagation with α ≥ 2 is of course the standard one.
Fluid model: Consider n mobiles located on a line at
positions −L+j∆y+∆y2 , j = 0, 1, · · · , n−1 with separation
spacing ∆y = 2Ln . We use the letter y to represent the discrete
location for finite n, and the continuum location y ∈ (−L,L)
when n → ∞. Each mobile has power ∆p(y) = ∆y, so
that we may think of transmitted power density per unit
distance dp/dy as 1 power unit per unit distance, and the
total transmitted power as 2L power units. Consider the BS
located at x at a height of 1 unit from the line. The path loss
for a mobile at y is g(y− x) = [1 + (y − x)2]−α/2 (see (1)).
The total received power at the BS, if all of these are in the
same frequency band, is
En(x) :=
L−∆y/2∑
y=−L+∆y/2
g(y − x)∆y
→
∫ L
−L
g(y − x)dy = Eo(x),
where the limit is taken as n→∞. Similarly, the total received
power from mobiles in a set A ⊆ [−L,L] is
En(x,A) =
∑
y∈A
g(y − x)∆y
→
∫
A
g(y − x)dy = E(x,A).
E(x,A) was defined in (2) and Eo(x) was defined as
E(x, [−L,L]) immediately after.
SINR Density and throughput: Let I ⊆ [−L,L] denote
the set of locations that may be considered as interferer
locations. The SINR is then
SINRn(y, x, I) =
g(y − x)∆y
σ2 +
∑
y∈I g(y − x)∆y
As n → ∞, the denominator tends to E(x, I) + σ2, the
numerator goes to 0, and the ratio
SINRn(y, x, I)
∆y
→ g(y − x)
E(x, I) + σ2
,
so that the latter may be thought of as SINR density (SINR per
unit distance). Using Shannon’s capacity formula for Gaussian
channels, the data rate for a mobile at location y is
1
2
log (1 + SINRn(y, x, I)) ≈ 1
2
SINRn(y, x, I)
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where the natural logarithm is employed and the unit of
information is nats. (1 nat = 1/(log 2) bits ≈ 1.44 bits). The
aggregate throughput of mobiles in a set A ⊆ [−L,L] is∑
y∈A
1
2
SINRn(y, x, I)
→ 1
2
∫
A
g(y − x)
E(x, I) + σ2
dy =
1
2
E(x,A)
E(x, I) + σ2
,
which is taken as the utility of a BS in the continuum case.
SIC decoding: Let the interval A ⊆ [−L,L] denote a
set of locations associated with the BS at x. Suppose that the
BS employs SIC. An arbitrary decoding order is chosen and
communicated with the transmitters. For concreteness, let us
assume that mobiles are decoded in the decreasing order of y
in A. Then all mobiles in A that are to the left of a given user
at y will become interferers to y. The throughput for user at
y ∈ A is therefore
1
2
log
(
1 +
g(y − x)∆y
σ2 +
∑
y′<y,y′∈A g(y
′ − x)∆y
)
=
1
2
log

σ2 + ∑
y′≤y,y′∈A
g(y′ − x)∆y


− 1
2
log

σ2 + ∑
y′<y,y′∈A
g(y′ − x)∆y

 .
Summing these up over discrete y ∈ A, and passing to the
limit, we get the aggregate throughput of all the mobiles in
set A to be
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
y∈A g(y − x)∆y
σ2
)
→ 1
2
log
(
1 +
E(x,A)
σ2
)
,
an expression that is used in Sections V and VI for the utility
of BS. Note that this remains the sum utility regardless of the
decoding order chosen at the BS. Of course, the data rates for
each mobile will depend on its position in the decoding order.
The sender and the receiver should agree on this data rate and
employ an appropriate code.
Discussion: It should be noted that the two-dimensional
propagation (when α ∈ [1, 2)) and our treatment of mobiles
as fluid particles on a line are merely caricatures of real
life propagation models. The purpose of their study is to get
a qualitative feel for what one might expect in the three-
dimensional propagation model with mobiles distributed in a
plane and receiver antennas placed at a height from the plane.
See also the extension in Appendix H.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.1
That Eo is an even function, is obvious from (6). To see
the monotonicity, for x ≥ 0, write
Eo(0)− Eo(−x) =
∫ L
−L
g(y) dy −
∫ L+x
−L+x
g(y) dy (15)
=
∫ −L+x
−L
g(y) dy −
∫ L+x
L
g(y) dy
=
∫ x
0
[g(y − L)− g(y + L)] dy (16)
where (15) follows from (3), and (16) via a change of variable
y − L← y in the first integral and y + L← y in the second.
The integrand in (16) is positive for y ∈ [0, x]. This proves
the monotonicity.
APPENDIX C
CDMA SINGLE-FREQUENCY CASE: STRUCTURE OF
COOPERATIVE HIERARCHICAL EQUILIBRIA
a) In an optimal configuration the two BSs are placed
on the opposite sides of the origin: Assume that the two BSs
are placed at x1, x2 such that x1, x2 ≤ 0. The configuration
x1 = x2 < 0 is outperformed by x1 = x2 = 0, and hence
cannot be optimal. Next consider x1 < x2 ≤ 0 without loss
of generality. Under equilibrium, the cell A2 of BS 2 is a
convex set. Say A2 = [−a, b] ⊆ [−L,L]. The following are
observations that are easily seen.
• If a < b, the configuration {x1,−x2, A2 = [−a, b], A1 =
[−L,L]\[−a, b]} has better joint performance.
• If a > b, the configuration {x1,−x2, A2 = [−b, a], A1 =
[−L,L]\[−b, a]} has better joint performance.
• If a = b, the configuration {x1,−x2, A2 = [−a, b], A1 =
[−L,L]\[−a, b]} performs equally well.
In each case, the SINR-equilibrium of the modification can
only have better joint performance. This proves the claim.
b) In an optimal configuration, the cells of the two BSs
are convex: Without loss of generality, we may assume x1 ≤
0 ≤ x2 and that |x1| ≥ |x2| ≥ 0. Also assume that A2 =
[−a, b] such that a, b < L so that A1 = [−L,−a)∪(b, L] is not
convex (see Figure 14). But then the configuration {x1, x2 +
L−b, A1 = [−L,−a+(L−b)), A2 = [−a+(L−b), L]} (see
Figure 14) strictly outperforms the assumed one.
−a
0
x2
x1
x1
−L
−L L
L
0 b
−a + (L− b) x2 + (L − b)
Fig. 14. In the above two figures A2 = [−a, b] and [−a+ (L− b), L], re-
spectively. The top one can not be an optimal configuration; it is outperformed
by the bottom one.
Indeed, BS 2’s utility remains the same, and a few of
BS 1 mobiles have moved closer, keeping the same associated
population size. This yields a contradiction and proves the
convexity claim.
The above observation implies that in a hierarchical optimal
configuration, the cells are of the form [−L, a] and (a, L].
Furthermore, the optimal configuration is also yielded by the
following hierarchical problem. For a given partition, i.e., a
fixed a, the BSs are placed to optimize throughputs of the
respective cells. However, the partition is made to maximize
the sum utility of both the BSs while keeping in mind their
subsequent selfish placements.
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APPENDIX D
THE RELAXED FIXED POINT ITERATION
The algorithm: (i) First we determine the starting point.
We aim at finding a point B0 such that both B0 and F (B0)
lie in (βmin, βmax). Recall that both B and F (B) belong to
[Bmin, Bmax] and F (B) is decreasing in B. Also, we can
easily verify that F (B) = Bmax for all B in5 [Bmin, βmin],
and F (B) = Bmin for all B in [βmax, Bmax]. A suitable choice
of B0 depends on the order of the quantities Bmin, Bmax, βmin
and βmax. The following are the four possible orders. (Note
that the fixed point lies in (Bmin, Bmax) ∩ (βmin, βmax), so
the two intervals must intersect.)
1) If βmin ≤ Bmin < Bmax ≤ βmax, choose a B0 ∈
(Bmin, Bmax).
2) If Bmin < βmin < Bmax < βmax, there are two
possibilities.
a) If F (Bmax) > βmin, choose B0 ∈ (βmin, Bmax).
b) If F (Bmax) ≤ βmin, choose B0 ∈
(βmin, F
−1(βmin)).
3) If βmin < Bmin < βmax < Bmax, again there are two
possibilities.
a) If F (Bmin) < βmax, choose B0 ∈ (Bmin, βmax).
b) If F (Bmin) ≥ βmax, choose B0 ∈
(F−1(βmax), βmax).
4) If Bmin < βmin < βmax < Bmax, choose a B0 ∈
(F−1(βmax), F
−1(βmin)).
Set B¯ = F (B0). Our selection procedure ensures that B0 and
B¯ are in (βmin, βmax). If B¯ = B0, it is the desired fixed
point. So, assume B¯ > B0; the case B¯ < B0 is handled
similarly. From our earlier discussion F ′(B) is bounded over
[B0, B¯] ( (βmin, βmax), i.e., there is a D < ∞ such that
|F ′(B)| ≤ D for all B ∈ [B0, B¯]. Now, we focus only on this
interval.
(ii) Choose a γ ≤ 11+D , and define
G(B) := γF (B) + (1− γ)B, B ∈ [B0, B¯]. (17)
(iii) Now iterate as Bn+1 = G(Bn), n = 0, 1, . . . .
Proposition D.1: The iterates converge to the fixed point of
F (B) = B.
Proof: We prove that iterates as defined in Step 3) form
a nondecreasing sequence. From (17), it suffices to show that
F (Bn) ≥ Bn for all n. We show this inductively. Since B¯ >
B0, the claim is true for n = 0. Assume F (Bn) ≥ Bn for
some n. From (17), we conclude that Bn+1 ≥ Bn. Since
|F ′(B)| ≤ D, we get
F (Bn)− F (Bn+1) ≤ D(Bn+1 −Bn). (18)
Moreover, our choice of γ (see Step (ii)) together with (17)
ensures that
D(Bn+1 −Bn) ≤ F (Bn)−Bn+1.
Combining the above two inequalities we get F (Bn+1) ≥
Bn+1. This completes the induction step.
Note that (18) requires Bn, Bn+1 ≤ B¯ which can also
be shown inductively, as follows. Since B1 is a convex
5[a, b] = ∅ if a > b.
combination of B0 and B¯ := F (B0), B1 ≤ B¯. Now assume
B0 ≤ B1 ≤ . . . Bn ≤ B¯. This immediately implies that
Bn+1 = γF (Bn) + (1− γ)Bn
≤ γF (B0) + (1− γ)B¯
= B¯.
Since the sequence Bn, n = 0, 1, . . . is bounded and non-
decreasing, it converges. Finally, since G(B) is a continuous
function of B, the limit point B∗ is a fixed point of G(B) = B.
Substituting in (17), we get F (B∗) = B∗. Therefore B∗ is the
desired fixed point.
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Fig. 15. Two-frequencies case; F(B) vs B. The four subplots illustrate the four
possible scenarios as described in Step 1 of the relaxed fixed point iteration.
The four subplots in Figure 15 illustrate the four possible
scenarios described in Step 1 above. We set L = 10, α = 2
and σ = 0.3. Each subplot shows the corresponding locations
of BSs. Note that, in all the cases, d = |x1 − x2|/2 = 2.5
which also fixes (βmin, βmax) = (0.1926, 5.1926). Bmin and
Bmax corresponding to the four subplots are as in Table III.
TABLE III
Bmin AND Bmax IN THE FOUR SUBPLOTS OF FIGURE 15
x1 = 15 x1 = 10 x1 = 5 x1 = 0
x2 = 10 x2 = 5 x2 = 10 x2 = 5
Bmin 0.2364 0.1741 0.2364 0.1741
Bmax 1.6580 4.2306 5.7423 5.8045
Figure 16 shows convergence of the relaxed fixed point
iteration via an example: L = 10, α = 2 and σ = 0.3; BS 1
and BS 2 locations are set to be −20 and −15 respectively.
Thus d = 2.5, and (βmin, βmax) = (0.1926, 5.1926). Also
Bmin = 0.6031 while Bmax = 1.3180. We set β = 0.1 and
start the iteration with B0 = 1.3. Iterations quickly converge
to the unique fixed point 0.726.
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Fig. 16. Two frequencies case; convergence of the relaxed fixed point
iteration.
APPENDIX E
TWO-FREQUENCIES CASE: SUM RECEIVED POWER
Proposition E.1: Let x1 ≤ x2 and let v = (x1 + x2)/2
denote the mid-point. Then following results hold.
(i) Let (A1, A2) denote a partition of [−L,L]. Then
max
(A1,A2)
[E(x1, A1) + E(x2, A2)]
≤ E(x1, [−L, v]) + E(x2, (v, L]).
(ii) Furthermore, E(x1, [−L, v])+E(x2, (v, L]) is maximized
at −x1 = x2 = L/2. The cell partition in this case is [−L, 0]
and (0, L].
Proof: The first statement is obvious once we write out
the integrals and recognize that the integrand is non-negative,
symmetric, and g(y) is decreasing in |y|. For the same reason,
we may upper bound the sum in the second statement, by
E(x1, I1)+E(x2, I2) where I1 is an interval of length L+ v
centered at x1 and I2 is an interval of length L−v centered at
x2. ((I1, I2) may not be a partition of [−L,L]). Constraining
the sum of interval lengths to be 2L, the upper bound is
further maximized when the intervals are of equal length L.
But this upper bound is achieved when −x1 = x2 = L/2.
The corresponding intervals [−L, 0] and (0, L] constitute a
cell partition, as required. This concludes the proof.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2
Let (x1, x2) be an equilibrium. We may assume, without
loss of generality, that x1 ∈ [−L, 0], x2 ∈ [0, L] (see Corol-
lary 6.1). Differentiating r2(x1, x2) with respect to x2, we get
∂r2(x1, x2)
∂x2
=
1
2
g
(
x2 − x1
2
)
− g(L− x2) (19)
The rest of the proof is divided into two parts.
Part 1: We first check whether x1 = x2 = 0 is an
equilibrium. Note that r2(0, x2) is an even, continuous and
differentiable function of x2. From (19)
∂r2(0, x2)
∂x2
= 0
⇐⇒ x22
(
1− a
4
)
− 2Lx2 + L2 − (a− 1) = 0,
which implies
x2 =


L±
√
aL2
4
+(a−1)(1−a
4
)
1− a
4
, a ∈ (1, 4)
L2−(a−1)
2L , a = 4
Now, it is easy to check that ∂r2(0,x2)∂x2 < 0 for all x2 ∈ (0, L],
if L ≤ √a− 1. Thus, BR2(0) = 0. Analogously, BR1(0) =
0. So, (0, 0) is an equilibrium, provided L ≤ √a− 1. For
L >
√
a− 1,
∂r2(0, x2)
∂x2
∣∣∣∣
x2=0+
=
1
2
g(0)− g(L)
=
1
2
− 1
(1 + L2)α/2
> 0.
Hence BR2(0) 6= 0. Thus (0, 0) can not be an equilibrium.
Part 2: Next, let (x1, x2) 6= (0, 0). Then, by assumption,
we have x2 > x1. From (19), a best response x2 to BS 1’s
location x1 should satisfy
(L − x2)2 + 1 = a
[
1 +
(
x2 − x1
2
)2]
. (20)
Similarly, a best response x1 to BS 2’s location x2 should
satisfy
(L + x1)
2 + 1 = a
[
1 +
(
x2 − x1
2
)2]
. (21)
Combining (20) and (21) we get
(x1 + x2)(x2 − x1 − 2L) = 0
If x2 − x1 = 2L, the only feasible candidate is (x1, x2) =
(−L,L). But, this contradicts (21). Hence x2 = −x1. Again,
from (21), we have
(L+ x1)
2 + 1 = a(1 + x21)
which implies
x1 =
L±√aL2 − (a− 1)2
a− 1 .
Since x1 ∈ [−L, 0], we must have
√
aL2 − (a− 1)2 > L,
so there will be no feasible solution for L <
√
a− 1.
Furthermore,
x1 = −x2 = 1
a− 1
(
−L+
√
aL2 − (a− 1)2
)
is the unique feasible candidate for L ≥ √a− 1. Finally, let
x∗ := 1a−1
(
−L+√aL2 − (a− 1)2). We now show that
x1 = −x2 = x∗ is indeed an equilibrium if L ≥
√
a− 1.
To see this, note that
∂2r2(x
∗, x2)
∂x22
∣∣∣∣
x2=−x∗
=
1
4
g′(−x∗) + g′(L+ x∗) < 0,
because x∗ < 0 and L + x∗ > 0. This assures that −x∗ is
indeed a maximum point, i.e., −x∗ = BR2(x∗). Similarly, one
can verify that x∗ = BR1(−x∗).
Parts 1 and 2 together complete the proof.
16
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.3
Lemma 6.1 implies that it is sufficient to show the result
for the case when, xo1, xo2 ∈ [−L,L]. Assume x1 ≤ 0.
Solving (20), we get
x2 =
{
4L−ax1−2
√
a(L−x1)2+(4−a)(a−1)
4−a , a ∈ (1, 4)
L+x1
2 − 32(L−x1) , a = 4
(22)
For a ∈ (1, 4), the solution to (20) with the positive sign
leads to x2 > L. We therefore discard it, because BR2(x1) ∈
[0, L]. The other candidate is the x2 in (22) which satisfies
x1 < x2 < L. This further implies that
∂2r2(x1, x2)
∂x22
=
1
4
g′
(
x2 − x1
2
)
+ g′(L− x2) < 0.
Hence x2 as given in (22) is indeed BR2(x1). Now, it can
also be seen that 0 < ∂BR2(x1)∂x1 < 1− ǫ where ǫ > 0 depends
on a. An analogous result holds for x1 > 0 also. Analogous
results also hold for ∂BR1(x2)∂x2 . Thus a small change in the
position of a BS causes an even smaller change (in the same
direction) in the position of the other BS. The best responses
thus constitute a contraction map and the dynamics converges
to the equilibrium.
APPENDIX H
CDMA SINGLE-FREQUENCY CASE: EXTENSION TO TWO
DIMENSIONS
A large number of mobiles are located uniformly over the
two dimensional plain. Two BSs are placed at (x1, y1, 1)
and (x2, y2, 1) respectively. The BSs operate on the same
frequency band. The path loss model is as before. The SINR-
equilibrium association can be defined in a similar way as in
Definition 2.1. Here, we provide closed form expressions for
cell boundaries in the equilibrium. As in Section III-A, we
define
Bα =
(
Eo(x1, y1) + σ
2
Eo(x2, y2) + σ2
)1/α
.
When the two BSs are collocated, every association profile is
an SINR-equilibrium. If (x1, y1) 6= (x2, y2) and still Bα = 1,
there is unique SINR-equilibrium association in which mobiles
associate with the BS which is closer. To study the asymmetric
scenarios, without loss of generality assume that Bα < 1, i.e.,
the interference at BS 2, Eo(x2, y2), is more than that at BS 1,
Eo(x1, y1). Mobiles at (x, y) connect to BS 2 if they do not
have a lower SINR density at (x2, y2), i.e.,
[(x− x2)2 + (y − y2)2 + 1]−α/2
Eo(x2, y2) + σ2
≥ [(x− x1)
2 + (y − y1)2 + 1]−α/2
Eo(x1, y1) + σ2
which is equivalent to
(x−x2)2+(y− y2)2+1 ≤
(
(x− x1)2 + (y − y1)2 + 1
)
B2α.
This inequality straightforwardly yields that the set connecting
to BS 2 is nonempty only if
τ :=
√
(x1 − x2)2 + (y1 − y2)2Bα
1− B2α
≥ 1.
Furthermore, in case of a strict inequality above, the set is a
disc with center (
x2 − x1B2α
1−B2α
,
y2 − y1B2α
1−B2α
)
and radius
√
τ2 − 1.
Note that in the one-dimensional case, the BS with higher
interference had an interval as its cell. The complement of this
interval joined the second BS. The analog of the interval-type
cell in two dimensions is a disc-type cell. Further, observe
that we did not make any assumptions on the population
density. The cell partition is always a disc and its complement.
However, the population density does affect the interference
and therefore the actual parameters of the cell partition.
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